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Abstract
This paper studies the potential gains of monetary and macro-prudential policies that lean
against news-driven boom-bust cycles in housing prices and credit generated by expectations
of future macroeconomic developments. First, we nd no trade-o between the traditional
goals of monetary policy and leaning against boom-bust cycles. An interest-rate rule that
completely stabilizes ination is not optimal. In contrast, an interest-rate rule that responds
to nancial variables mitigates macroeconomic and nancial cycles and is welfare improving
relative to the estimated rule. Second, counter-cyclical Loan-to-Value rules that respond to
credit growth do not increase ination volatility and are more eective in maintaining a stable
provision of nancial intermediation than interest-rate rules that respond to nancial variables.
Heterogeneity in the welfare implications for borrowers and savers make it dicult to rank the
two policy frameworks.
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11 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has demonstrated the need for a global macro-prudential approach to
supervision and regulation of the nancial sector. The traditional (micro) focus on the soundness
of individual nancial institutions proved to be insucient in limiting volatility and the spreading
of vulnerabilities from one nancial institution to another. Hence, the new emphasis on the design
of macro-prudential policies that lean against the nancial cycle and aim at maintaining a \stable
provision of nancial intermediation services to the wider economy [...] to avoid the type of boom
and bust cycles in the supply of credit and liquidity that has marked the recent nancial crisis."1
However, little is still known about macro-prudential policies, how they should be implemented
and their potential gains. This paper contributes to the current debate on the implementation and
eectiveness of macro-prudential tools by evaluating policies that make the Loan-to-Value (LTV
henceforth) ratio respond to macroeconomic conditions and vary in a counter-cyclical manner. We
compare the eectiveness of such policy tools against more traditional policies, such as interest rate
rules that respond to nancial variables.
For this analysis we rely on the model of the housing market developed by Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) and extended by Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) to incorporate expectations-driven
cycles. Changes in expectations about future economic conditions are plausible sources of optimism
on future house price appreciation that generate boom-bust cycles characterized by co-movement
in house prices, GDP, consumption, investment, household's debt and hours worked as in the data.
Expectations that lead to macroeconomic booms distort consumption and investment plans. Their
sudden reversals have negative eects on economic and nancial decisions that transmit across
sectors and generate macroeconomic instability.
The goal of this paper is to assess alternative policies in terms of their eectiveness in mitigat-
ing boom-bust cycles and macroeconomic volatility and their impact on welfare. We rst consider
whether standard monetary policy, i.e. in the absence of macro-prudential goals, can contribute
to making boom-bust cycles in credit and housing prices less severe. We nd that strict ination
targeting delivers higher volatility of both housing prices and the loan-to-GDP ratio and is detri-
mental to welfare relative to an estimated rule. In fact, a strict anti-inationary stance generates
high volatility of the real interest rate that, in the presence of nominal debt contracts, implies a
great deal of wealth redistribution between lenders and borrowers. Hence, a policy that completely
stabilizes ination is severely suboptimal compared to a more moderate anti-inationary stance
1See Bank of England, The role of macro-prudential policy, discussion paper November 2009.
2such as an estimated Taylor-type rule. We also consider an interest-rate response to expected ina-
tion, but, we nd that it yields only marginal gains in terms of stabilization relative to a Taylor-type
rule that targets current ination.
There is an ongoing debate over whether the monetary authority should react to nancial
variables to avoid bubbles in asset prices and large variations in credit. Our paper analyzes interest-
rate rules that respond to either credit growth or housing price growth. The information content of
credit aggregates is such that an interest-rate rule that responds to credit growth mitigates boom-
bust cycles and macroeconomic volatility. We document that responding to credit growth reduces
the amplitude of booms, avoids the occurrence of busts, and is, thus, welfare improving.
We also consider macro-prudential policies aimed at containing boom-bust cycles in credit and
housing prices. We dene macro-prudential policy as the use of the LTV ratio as a policy tool. We
study whether counter-cyclical LTV ratio policies can be eective in providing a stable supply of
nancial intermediation, i.e. loans, to the household sector so as to avoid spill-over to the macro-
economy. The eectiveness of alternative macro-prudential policies is measured both in terms of
the volatility of the debt-to-GDP ratio and the welfare of the agents in the model. We investigate
the implications of counter-cyclical LTV rules that respond to output growth, credit growth, and
housing prices growth. We nd that LTV rules responding to credit growth are the only policies
leading to a Pareto improvement relative to the benchmark policy. Counter-cyclical LTV rules are
eective in mitigating boom-bust cycles in housing prices and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Reducing
LTV ratios and thereby tightening nancial conditions during the boom phase while raising LTV
ratios and allowing for easier access to credit during the bust phase is an eective policy to keep
credit stable in response to shocks and news.
Next we compare LTV-ratio policies and interest-rate rules that target macro-prudential goals.
Compared to interest-rate rules that respond to nancial variables, counter-cyclical LTV ratios
are more eective in stabilizing households' debt, debt-to-GDP, and ination. According to the
welfare criterion borrowers prefer LTV rules because they benet from the more stable supply
of credit generate by active macro-prudential policy. Lenders, on the other hand, are better o
under an interest-rate rule that responds directly to credit growth and more eectively stabilizes
consumption. Hence, welfare heterogeneity precludes an unanimous ranking of these alternative
policies.
This paper is related to two recent strands of the business cycle literature, one on asset price
bubbles and monetary policy and the other on macro-prudential policy. The literature on asset-price
movements and monetary policy relies mostly on models of exogenous bubbles, as in Bernanke and
3Gertler (2001) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002). In these models, the market price of an asset is the
sum of its fundamentals implied by competitive equilibrium and an exogenous bubble component
that stochastically emerges and disappears over time. Since the insurgence, size and burst of the
bubble are exogenously determined, these models do not allow for any feedback from the conduct
of monetary policy to the occurrence and the magnitude of boom-bust cycles in asset prices. Thus,
unless asset prices signal changes in expected ination, an anti-inationary monetary policy is
generally optimal in such environments.2 Cecchetti et al. (2000) analyze rules that minimize a
weighted sum of output and ination variability to nd that macroeconomic stabilization can be
improved by adjusting the interest rate also in response to asset price misalignments. Christiano,
Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2008) introduce expectations on future productivity as a source of
uctuations in asset prices in a model  a la Bernanke et al. (1999). When they add credit growth
to the interest-rate rule, the equilibrium response of the economy to news shocks is nearly optimal.
Our paper diers from these contributions in a number of ways. It analyzes optimal monetary
policy in the presence of booms and busts in housing where boom-bust cycles arise in response
to expectations of future changes not only about productivity but also about other shocks, such
as monetary policy.3 Lastly, we additionally consider macro-prudential policy and compare the
eectiveness of interest-rate rules against LTV rules both in terms of welfare and in smoothing
macroeconomic and nancial cycles.4
A recent literature investigates the design and implementation of macro-prudential policy in
models of the housing market.5 Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2010) use ad-hoc loss functions to show
that, compared to capital requirement rules, LTV rules are more eective in reducing the variability
of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2009) document that macroeconomic tools
may be useful to mitigate the impact of nancial shocks. However, they nd no role for macro-
prudential policy in booms generated by higher productivity. Unlike these contributions, our paper
evaluates policies in response to a richer stochastic structure that allows for both current and
2As it is optimal in standard models with nominal stickiness like in Woodford (2003), Erceg, Henderson and Levin
(2000) and Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2006).
3Using simplied versions of the model of the housing market adopted in this paper that abstract from boom-bust
cycles dynamics, Monacelli (2006) and Mendicino and Pescatori (2008) highlight the optimality of a certain degree
of ination volatility. These two studies analyze the Ramsey equilibrium and optimal simple rules, respectively.
4For some recent papers on optimal monetary policy and asset prices, see Faia and Monacelli (2006), Gilchrist
and Saito (2006), and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007).
5See Angeloni and Faia (2010) for macro-prudential policy in a model with credit frictions at the rm level but
without housing.
4expected shocks and is consistent with boom-bust dynamics in house prices. Most importantly, our
paper compares policies in terms of their welfare implications.
Since Beautry and Portier (2004, 2007) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), several contributions
have highlighted the importance of expectations-driven cycles as a source of business cycle uctu-
ations. We do not review this literature, but rather focus on the contributions that are closer to
our paper. Among others, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) document that news on future neu-
tral productivity shocks, investment-specic shocks, and government spending shocks account for a
sizable fraction of aggregate uctuations in postwar United States. Christiano et al. (2008) shows
that expectations about future productivity can be a plausible mechanism to generate stock-market
boom-bust cycles. Milani and Treadwell (2010) consider expectations on the policy rate and nd
that anticipated policy shocks play a larger role in the business cycle than unanticipated ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey describes the model and section 3
describes the method used for conducting welfare analysis. Section 4 and 5 investigate interest-rate
and LTV rules, respectively. Section 6 compares interest-rate rules and macro-prudential policy, as
represented by LTV rules. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we briey describe the model economy. We consider an economy populated by
households, producers of nal goods for consumption and investment purposes, a continuum of
retailers, housing producers and a central bank. The framework follows Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
and Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010).
Households. The economy is populated by two types of households: the Saver and the Bor-
rower. They both work in the production of consumption goods, n
0





t; and accumulate housing, h
0
t. They dier in their discount factor, ( and 
0
). Borrowers (denoted
by 0) feature a relatively lower subjective discount factor that in equilibrium generates an incentive
to anticipate future consumption to the current period through borrowing. Hence, the ex-ante
heterogeneity induces credit ows between the two types of agents. This modeling feature has been
introduced in macro models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended by Iacoviello (2005) to a
business cycle framework with housing investment.















































































Except for the gross nominal interest rate, R, all the variables are expressed in real terms; t is




h;t are the wages paid in the two sectors of production, and qt
is the price of housing in real terms. Houses depreciate at rate h and j determines the relative
weight in utility on housing services. Limit on borrowing is introduced through the assumption
that households cannot borrow more than a fraction, m, of the next-period value of the housing
stock. The borrowing constraint is consistent with standard lending criteria used in the mortgage
and consumer loan markets. Households set wages in a monopolistic way. Xwc;t and Xwh;t are
markups on the wages paid in the two sectors. Wages are adjusted subject to a Calvo scheme with
a given probability every period.
The Savers choose how much to consume, to work and to invest in housing facing a similar
problem. However, they also invest in capital and receive the prots of the rms. Investment-
specic technology shocks, Ah;t; are assumed to aect capital investment in the goods-sector.
Firms. Final good producing rms produce non-durable goods (Y) and new houses (IH). Both
sectors face Cobb-Douglas production functions. The housing sector uses capital, kh; land, l,
intermediate inputs, kb; and labor supplied by the savers, n; and the borrowers, n
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Ah;t and Ac;t are the productivity shocks to the housing- and goods-sector, respectively. Firms
pay wages to households and repay rented capital to the Savers. Retailers, owned by the Savers,
dierentiate nal goods and act in a monopolistically competitive market. Prices can be adjusted
6with probability 1  every period, by following a Calvo-setting. Monopolistic competition occurs
at the retail level, leading to the following forward-looking Philips curve:




  ln(Xt=X) + up;t
where  =
(1 )(1 )
 , and Xt represents the price markup and up;t is a cost-push shock. Housing
prices are assumed to be exible.
Monetary Authority. We assume that the central bank follows a Taylor-type rule as esti-













where rr is the steady state real interest rate and uR;t is a monetary policy shock. The central
bank's target is assumed to be time varying and subject to a persistent shock, As;t: GDP is dened
as the sum of consumption and investment at constant prices. Thus,
GDPt = Ct + IKt + qIHt;
where q is real housing prices at the steady state.
Shocks. Productivity in the consumption (Ac;t), investment (Ak;t), and housing sector (Ah;t)
follows
ln(Az;t) = tln(1 + Az) + ln(Zz;t);
where Az are the net growth rates of technology in each sector,
ln(Zz;t) = Az ln(Zz;t 1) + uz;t:
uz;t is the innovation and z = fc;k;hg: The ination target (As;t) and loan-to-value ratio (m)
shocks are assumed to follow an AR(1) process. The cost-push shock (up;t) and the shock to the
policy rule (uR;t) are assumed to be i:i:d. We set the model's parameters, persistence and standard
deviation of the shocks equal to the mean of the posterior distribution estimated by Iacoviello and
Neri (2010). These values are summarized in Table 1.
We introduce expectations of future macroeconomic developments as in Christiano et al. (2008)
and assume that the error term of the shock consists of an unanticipated component, "z;t; and an
anticipated change n quarters in advance, "z;t n;
uz;t = "z;t + "z;t n;
7where "z;t is i.i.d. and z = fc;h;k;p;R;sg: Thus, at time t agents receive a signal about future
macroeconomic conditions at time t+n: If the expected movement doesn't occur, then "z;t =  "z;t n
and uz;t = 0.
In addition to expectations on future productivity, we allow in the model for news on several
other shocks as originated in the housing market, the production sector and the conduct of monetary
policy. In particular, we introduce expectations on future productivity (Ac;t+n), on the supply of
houses, (Ah;t+n), on the cost of transforming output into capital, (Ak;t+n), and on the policy rate,
(uR;t+n), on deviations in the central bank ination target, (As;t) and on inationary pressures,
(up;t). As shown by Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2010) these types of expectations that are
not matched generates boom-bust cycles in the housing market characterized by co-movement in
house prices, GDP, consumption, investment, households' debt and hours worked as in the data.
3 Welfare Analysis
Our paper studies whether interest-rate or macro-prudential policies can achieve macroeconomic
stabilization and improve welfare in the presence of a rich stochastic structure that allows for
both anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Since we assume that the policymaker has the same
information set as private agents, the ex-ante optimal policy is independent of the realization of
expectations. It is plausible to think that LTV and interest-rate rules optimized conditional only
on unfullled expectations would be more successful in stabilizing boom-bust cycles. However,
given the diculty in identifying the source of uctuations, we nd more interesting to characterize
monetary and macro-prudential policy under a mixture of shocks and news that proxies changes
into both current and expected economic conditions. As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), we
study ex-ante optimal simple rules based on the second-order approximate solution of the model.























h;t) + iEtV i
t+1,
where i = f0;00 g denotes the welfare of the Borrowers and the Savers, respectively. We augment





6The results are based on the second-order approximate solution and not conditional on stochastic simulations of
8Since the rules considered in the paper do not have rst-order eects, the deterministic steady state
of the model is the same across the alternative regimes. Nevertheless, dierent policy regimes are
associated with dierent stochastic steady states. In order not to neglect welfare eects occurring
during the transition from one stochastic steady state to another, we compute the welfare implied
by the dierent rules conditional on the initial state being the deterministic steady state. We
explore the welfare performance of operational rules that determine either the interest rate or
the LTV ratio as a function of observable macroeconomic variables. Alternative policy rules are
compared in terms of a consumption equivalent measure, i, that would equate welfare ~ V i
t under
the optimized policy rule to the level of welfare under the deterministic steady state  V i where
steady-state consumption is ci(1   i):
~ V i








where variables without time subscripts refer to the steady state.
4 Interest-rate Policy
This section analyzes interest-rate rules and their eectiveness in stabilizing the macro-economy
under a rich stochastic structure that includes, among other, current and anticipated shocks to
the policy rate and the central bank ination target. A high degree of transparency in monetary
policy is likely to reduce the uncertainty about future monetary policy actions and therefore reduce
the occurrence of unfullled expectations about the future conduct of monetary policy. In the
following we show that, independently of news about monetary policy, the monetary authority can
aect the size and occurrence of boom-bust cycles stemming from expectations on other types of
future macroeconomic developments by aecting inationary expectations.
4.1 Anti-Inationary Stance
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 compare the standard deviations of some aggregate and group-specic
variables as delivered by the model under the estimated Taylor rule and a strict anti-inationary
stance. We assume that, under strict anti-inationary stance, the monetary authority targets only
the model. In particular, the second-order approximate solution for the welfare functions, V
i




2) , where 
2 is the variance of the shocks. The coecients on the variance of the shocks depend on the
model's parameters including the coecients in the policy rules.
9ination and credibly maintains it constant without deviating from the target. Thus, expectations
on the policy rate and the central bank's target are stabilized. The estimated rule delivers much
lower volatility of all variables, aggregate and individual, relative to a strict anti-inationary stance.
At the individual level, a strict anti-inationary stance is accompanied by larger volatility of both
consumption and hours. Column 1 and 2 in Table 3 report the welfare of Savers and Borrowers
under the estimated rule and the strict anti-inationary stance, respectively. Both Savers and
Borrowers are strictly better o under the estimated rule.
The model we rely on diers from the standard New-Keynesian model in three dimensions:
heterogeneous discount factors, nominal household debt, and news shocks. Monacelli (2006) inves-
tigates the optimal design of monetary policy in a simplied version of the model used in this paper
that abstracts from news shocks. In the presence of technology shocks, the Ramsey equilibrium is
characterized by some ination volatility. Mendicino and Pescatori (2008) study ex-ante optimal
interest-rate rules under a combination of shocks and show that, in the presence of nominal debt,
monetary policy can avoid the welfare-reducing redistribution generated by nominal contracts by
stabilizing the real interest rate, thereby allowing agents to share risk optimally. Hence, there is a
trade-o between minimizing the distortions generated by nominal price rigidities and those gen-
erated by nominal debt. If the monetary authority completely stabilizes ination, the uncertainty
related to the real interest rate, namely the real rate of repayment of debt, is larger. In fact, a
strong anti-inationary stance exacerbates macroeconomic uctuations because it makes the real
rate extremely volatile. Larger volatility of the real rate means higher uncertainty about the rate
of repayment of the debt and higher volatility of consumption and hours. The presence of news
shocks does not alter this result. In our framework a strict anti-inationary stance delivers higher
volatility of both housing prices and the loan-to GDP ratio and lower welfare relative to the esti-
mated rule. The rise in volatility is particularly sizable in housing investment and hours worked in
the housing sector. See Table 2.
Figures 1 and 2 analyze the relationship between the standard deviation of ination and output
as a function of the central bank's responsiveness to ination, r. The dashed line considers a policy
response to the current ination rate, t; the solid line is the response to expected future ination.
The ecient frontier in Figure 1 conrms the existence of a trade-o between the variability of
output and that of ination.7 In other words, an inertial interest-rate rule that targets ination
and output cannot simultaneously reduce the volatility of GDP and ination. Figure 2 displays
7Figures 1 and 2 display the standard deviation of some variables with respect to r within the range 1.5 to 4.5,
while rY and rR are kept constant and equal to the values estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
10the standard deviation of several variables with respect to the interest-rate response to ination,
r. A stronger response to deviations of ination from its target reduces the volatility of ination
at the cost of increased macroeconomic volatility.
In the presence of news shocks agents face substantial uncertainty about the future development
of the economy. Thus, we assess the gains of responding to expected ination as a variable that
contains information about the future state of the economy. The ecient frontier shifts inwards
when the monetary authority reacts to expected ination, as seen in Figure 1. Keeping the standard
deviation of ination constant, the corresponding decline in the standard deviation of output is
sizable. Hence, monetary policy is slightly more eective if it responds to expected rather than
current ination. Figure 2 also shows that an interest-rate rule that that responds to expected
rather than current ination yields lower volatility of GDP and nancial variables. However, it
delivers higher volatility of ination. Targeting expected ination makes Rt react by more because,
during the boom-phase, movements in future ination are larger than current ination. Agents
internalize the stronger reaction in the policy rate and respond to news shocks in a smoother way.
At the same time, the stronger the policy rate reaction, the larger the eect on current ination
and the higher its standard deviation.
4.2 Targeting Financial Variables
Should the monetary authority react to asset price or credit growth movements to avoid boom-bust
cycles in the nancial market? In what follows we assess alternative interest-rate rules that react














where xt = fbt;qtg: We set rR; ry and r equal to the estimated values and allow for positive
responses to the other target, namely rx  0.
To compare alternative interest-rate rules in a meaningful way, we rely on social welfare criteria.
More precisely, we select the weights of the interest-rate rule on either housing price ination or
credit growth for which, starting from the estimated rule, i.e. rQ and rB equal to zero, both agents
achieve higher welfare and none of the two agents is worse-o. The resulting interest-rate responses
are equal to 0.4 and 0.9 for rB and rQ, respectively. These results are based on a second-order
approximation.8 Figure 3 shows that targeting nancial variables is welfare improving with respect
8We start from rQ and rB equal to zero and we increase the response to either targets up to the points in which
both agents are better o. The other parameters are kept constant and equal to the estimated values.
11to the estimated rule. However, both Borrowers and Savers reach a higher maximum level of welfare
under an interest-rate rule that responds to credit growth.
Figure 4 compares the ecient frontiers. The solid line with dots and the dotted line allow
only for a response to current and expected future ination, respectively; the solid and dashed lines
allow also for an interest-rate response to variations in housing prices and credit, respectively.9
In comparison with a rule that responds to either current or expected ination, responding to
nancial variables yields signicant gains in terms of output and ination volatility. However,
targeting housing prices improves the output-ination trade-o to a lesser extent than targeting
credit growth.
Figures 5 and 6 report the transmission of expectations on future productivity and the policy
rate under three alternative interest-rate rules: the estimated rule (starred line); the rule responding
to house price ination, i.e. rQ equal to 0.9, (dashed line); the rule responding to credit growth, i.e.
rB equal to 0.4, (solid line). These three rules are characterized by dierent length and magnitude
of macroeconomic boom-bust cycles. First of all, the reaction of housing prices and household debt
is dampened by adding an indicator of potential vulnerabilities in the housing market such as credit
growth or housing price ination. This also leads to a more contained response of GDP. The same
result holds for other types of expectations of future macroeconomic developments (not shown in
the paper). It is important to stress that boom-bust cycles generated by unfullled expectations
are not completely oset by the monetary authority since we characterize optimal monetary under
the assumption that the economy can be hit by both anticipated and unanticipated shocks and
that unmatched expectations are a low probability event. Hence, we do not specically target the
smoothing of neither some particular types of shocks nor of boom-bust cycles.
All aggregate variables, except ination, are less volatile under the rule that targets credit
growth relative to the one that targets growth in housing prices, as shown in Table 2. Responding
to credit growth improves upon all interest-rate rules considered here not only in reducing volatility
but also by raising welfare of both groups, as shown in Table 3. Responding to credit growth reduces
the amplitude of the boom and avoids the occurrence of a recession at the end of the bust. Lower
volatility of household debt is coupled with higher volatility of ination. However, the welfare
criterion suggest that there is no trade-o between goals of monetary policy and the smoothing of
boom-bust cycles. As suggested earlier, a certain degree of (positive) ination volatility is optimal
9The ecient frontiers are computed with respect to r within the range 1.5 to 4.5. The other parameters are
kept constant and equal to the estimated values, in the case of rY and rR, and to the welfare improving responses
for rB and rQ:
12in our model as it helps smoothing out the real eects of changes in nominal debt. To sum up,
an interest-rate rule that responds to credit growth is successful in mitigating boom-bust cycles,
maintaining a stable provision of nancial intermediation over the cycle, and improving welfare for
both Savers and Borrowers relative to the estimated interest-rate rule.
5 LTV Ratio Policy
The recent nancial crisis, which was ignited by the bursting of the housing bubble in the United
States, has forced central banks to reconsider their policy framework. Should monetary policy
give explicit recognition to nancial stability goals? Or should nancial stability goals be pursued
by other instruments { such as LTV ratios? We address these questions in the remainder of the
paper. In this section we explore the eectiveness of LTV ratios as macro-prudential tools aimed at
nancial and macroeconomic stabilization. The next section compares interest-rate and LTV ratio
rules.
The international policy debate is currently focusing on the design of a macro-prudential policy
whose goal is to moderate credit cycles and to reduce nancial imbalances. To this respect, the
Basel Committee on the Global Financial System suggests: (1) the use of instruments \eective
in leaning against both the upswing and the downswing [in the nancial cycle]"; (2) the imple-
mentation of \predictable and transparent" policies that are set according to \easily observable
and reliable indicators"; (3) [policies that] \might apply narrowly to sectors where systemically
relevant imbalances are developing".10 The Committee identied the LTV ratio as one of the
macro-prudential tools that may act as an automatic stabilizer if adjusted in a counter-cyclical
manner.11
In the following we assess the benets of counter-cyclical LTV ratio rules that imply tighter
nancial conditions during booms in the housing market but looser nancial conditions during
the busts. In fact, counter-cyclical LTV ratio rules limit leverage in the upswing but broaden
it in the downswing. We compare rules that respond to GDP, credit, and housing price growth
in moderating the credit and housing cycle and evaluate them in terms of their eectiveness in
stabilizing the macro-economic and in terms of welfare. In practice, we assume
mt = mmt 1 + (1   m)m + (1   m)x (xt   xt 1) (4)
10See Basel Committee on the Global Financial System. 2010. Macro-prudential Instruments and Frameworks: a
Stocktaking of Issues and Experiences. CGFS Publications No 38.
11LTV ratio policies have been already used by Asian Central Banks after the crisis of 1997.
13where m is the steady state value for the LTV ratio, m is an autoregressive parameter that
we set equal to 0.5, and x is the response to alternative observable macroeconomic indicators,
where xt = fbt;qt;GDPtg. x = 0 corresponds to the case where the LTV ratio does not respond
to the variable chosen as imbalance indicator and macro-prudential policy is non-active. Negative
values of x make the LTV counter-cyclical because positive growth in the macroeconomic indicator
reduces the LTV ratio and brings a tightening in credit conditions. We measure the eectiveness
of alternative policy rules by looking at the volatility of the loans-to-GDP ratio and welfare. The
analysis conducted in this paper does not aim at designing optimal policies conditional on some
particular shocks, i.e. productivity or nancial shocks, but is based on the assumption that various
sources of uctuations, both anticipated and unanticipated, can aect the economy.
Figure 7 displays the standard deviation of some key macroeconomic variables under LTV rules
targeting credit, GDP, and housing price growth for values of x between 0 and -7. Three results
emerge. First, all three targeting rules are successful in reducing the volatility of GDP at constant
prices, although the rule targeting credit growth is more eective than the others. Second, the
three rules generate relatively small dierences in terms of the volatility of housing prices, housing
investment and ination. Third, counter-cyclical LTV rules that respond to credit growth are
eective in reducing the volatility of loans and the loan-to-GDP ratio while LTV rules targeting
GDP or housing price growth fail to do so. In fact, the standard deviation of loans and the loan-
to-GDP ratio increases with the responsiveness of the LTV rule to GDP and housing price growth.
The intuition is as follows. LTV rules that target credit growth generate smaller deviations of the
LTV ratio, mt, from its steady state value that eectively dampen the dynamics of credit. Current
shocks or news that, in the absence of counter-cyclical macro-prudential policies, would lead to a
credit boom now cause a reduction of the LTV ratio that remains below steady state while the
credit boom persists. As a result, loans are stabilized. This is not the case for LTV rules that
target GDP or housing price growth. These rules generate stronger instantaneous responses and
non-monotonic dynamics in the LTV ratio than policies that target credit growth and, thus, raise
the volatility of credit. In response to current shocks and news that would generate a housing
boom, these LTV rules reduce mt so much that loans instantaneously fall. This contraction in
credit curtails growth in housing prices and GDP that subsequently raise the LTV ratio, loans,
and the loan-to-GDP ratio above steady state. Hence, responding to GDP or housing price growth
generates larger volatility in mt and in credit aggregates. Figure 8 displays the impulse response
of the LTV and the loan-to-GDP ratio following a technological shock (left panel) and a monetary
shock (right panel). It is clear that the large response of the LTV ratio under targeting GDP or
14house price growth induces large, non-monotonic deviations in credit that raise volatility in the
economy.
Figure 9 shows welfare for Borrowers and Savers under the three alternative LTV rules for a
range of values of x between 0 and -7. LTV rules that target GDP and housing price growth bring
a welfare improvement for Savers but a welfare worsening for Borrowers. Only LTV rules targeting
credit growth are welfare improving for both groups of consumers. This result is a consequence
of the increased volatility of loans associated with the LTV rules that target GDP and housing
prices growth. Borrowers are credit-constrained and an increase in the volatility of loans implies an
increase in volatility of consumption of both non-durable goods and housing and thereby a lower
welfare for this group of consumers.
6 Monetary versus Macro-prudential Policy
The results presented above assess the contribution of alternative policy strategies aimed at reducing
the occurrence and amplitude of boom-bust cycles in credit and housing prices. Both an interest-
rate rule that directly responds to credit growth and a LTV ratio rule that responds to credit
growth in a counter-cyclical manner are successful in mitigating boom-bust cycles and stabilizing
the provision of credit.
Table 2 shows that, compared to the benchmark estimated economy, both policies reduce sig-
nicantly the volatility of households' debt but only slightly that of housing prices. However, the
lower volatility of credit and GDP induced by counter-cyclical LTV ratios are not coupled with a
substantial increase in the volatility of ination as in the case of an interest-rate response to credit
growth.
Table 3 reports the stochastic mean of individual variables in deviation from the steady state.
The rst two rows report the stochastic mean for Savers' and Borrowers' welfare levels; the other
rows report the percentage point deviation relative to the steady state, with negative numbers
referring to below steady-state values. Savers' welfare is maximized under an interest-rate response
to credit aggregates that implies lower volatility of consumption in both nondurable goods and
housing services and hours worked, as shown in Table 2. In contrast, Borrowers are better o
under the LTV rule, which leads to a higher level and lower volatility of credit. The welfare
gain delivered by the LTV ratio rule for Borrowers comes from the level eect rather than the
stabilization eect. Because of higher level of credit, as shown in Table 3, Borrowers experience
higher levels of consumption of both nondurable and housing consumption while slightly lower
15levels of hours worked.
Table 4 compares the performance in terms of welfare of the interest-rate and the LTV rule
that responds to credit growth. Savers' cost is the percentage point reduction in the deterministic
steady-state consumption that equalizes welfare at the deterministic steady state and under the
alternative policy rule. Positive numbers indicate that the consumer is better o at the deterministic
steady state; negative numbers indicate that the consumer is better o under the policy rule under
consideration relative to the deterministic steady state. Notice that negative numbers are possible
because of the presence of credit-constrained individuals. Savers are better o under the interest-
rate rule that responds to credit growth and Borrowers are better o under the LTV rule that
responds to credit growth (as already seen in Table 3). Hence, agent's heterogeneity fails to provide
us with a uniform ranking among the two policy frameworks. Interestingly, both policies lead to
a Pareto improvement from the starting point of the benchmark policy. Notice, however, that the
welfare gains for each group of agents of adopting their preferred rule relative to the other are small.
7 Conclusions
We analyze the monetary policy implications of expectations-driven cycles. An interest-rate policy
that completely stabilizes ination fails to mitigate boom-bust cycles. In contrast, an interest-rate
response to credit growth improves macroeconomic and nancial stability and welfare. Hence, there
is no trade-o between the goals of monetary policy and the smoothing of boom-bust cycles.
We also investigate the eectiveness of counter-cyclical macro-prudential rules in leaning against
boom-bust cycles. Counter-cyclical LTV rules that respond to credit growth are more eective in
stabilizing credit over the cycle than interest-rate rules that respond to credit growth because they
directly tighten nancial conditions during the boom phase and allow easier access to credit during
the bust phase. However, heterogeneity in terms of welfare prevent a clear ranking of the two policy
frameworks.
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19Parameters' Value
Technology  0.69 m 0.85
c 0.35 w;c 0.79 Shocks
h 0.10 w;c 0.08 AS 0.975
l 0.10 w;h 0.91 AC 0.95
b 0.10 w;h 0.40 AH 0.997
 0.79 Preferences AK 0.992








kh 0.03 j 0.12 AH 0.0193








AH 0.0008 Policy  0.0254
AK 0.0027 rR 0.59 p 0.0046
Stickiness r 1.44 As 0.0004
 0.83 rY 0.52
Table 1: Parameter Values Estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2009)
20Estimated Strict anti- Interest-rate Rule responding to LTV rule responding to
rule inationary stance housing ination credit growth credit growth
q = 0:9 b = 0:4 vb =  10
Consumption 0.0526 0.2358 0.0470 0.0419 0.0504
Business Investment 0.1128 1.1269 0.1044 0.0942 0.1129
Housing Investment 0.3299 2.6095 0.3300 0.3151 0.3294
Housing Prices 0.2369 0.5946 0.2363 0.2354 0.2368
GDP 0.0695 0.6071 0.0633 0.0539 0.0678
Ination 0.0147 - 0.0163 0.0174 0.0148
Household Debt 0.2192 3.595 0.1546 0.1207 0.0865
Debt-to-GDP 0.1811 3.2938 0.1250 0.1007 0.0935
Real Rate 0.0104 0.7846 0.0091 0.0080 0.0106
Hours housing sector 0.1705 3.124 0.1623 0.1343 0.1692
Hours consumption sec. 0.0573 0.6514 0.0514 0.0349 0.0547
Saver's Consumption 0.0459 0.2339 0.0417 0.0385 0.045
Borrower's Consumption 0.0957 0.6299 0.0832 0.0674 0.0894
Saver's Hours in C 0.0625 0.6577 0.0561 0.0385 0.0589
Borrower's Hours in C 0.0401 0.6681 0.0356 0.0231 0.0445
Saver's Hours in H 0.1731 3.1250 0.1654 0.1364 0.1713
Borrower's Hours in H 0.1611 3.1216 0.1514 0.1269 0.1621
Saver's Housing Demand 0.2521 0.5599 0.2548 0.2507 0.2515
Borrower's Housing Demand 0.3061 3.3780 0.2836 0.2554 0.2559
Standard deviation in percentage terms. All shocks, Second Order Approximation.
Table 2: Stabilization Eect: Standard Deviations
2
1Estimated Strict anti Rule responding to Rule responding to LTV rule responding to
rule inationary stance housing ination credit growth credit growth
q = 0:9 b = 0:4 vb =  10
Savers' welfare -0.1165 -0.3264 -0.1163 -0.1154 -0.1163
Borrowers' welfare -2.4526 -4.2577 -2.4513 -2.4507 -2.4506
Saver's Consumption 0.4132 0.50238 0.4128 0.4124 0.4132
Borrower's Consumption -1.2117 -1.3927 -1.2123 -1.2127 -1.2114
Saver's Hours in C -0.2612 -0.32386 -0.2615 -0.2616 -0.2611
Borrower's Hours in C -0.0720 -0.13215 -0.0718 -0.0719 -0.0719
Saver's Hours in H -1.7640 -3.8191 -1.7633 -1.7617 -1.7642
Borrower's Hours in H -1.3592 -3.1258 -1.3582 -1.3567 -1.3592
Saver's Housing Demand 2.6737 4.5104 2.6732 2.6714 2.6736
Borrower's Housing Demand 0.8360 -5.6417 0.8461 0.8442 0.8494
Household's debt 0.5415 -7.4428 0.5518 0.5509 0.5547
Stochastic means of log-transformed variables. All shocks, Second Order Approximation.
Table 3: Level Eect: Stochastic Means
2
2Estimated Rule responding to LTV rule responding to
rule credit growth credit growth
b = 0:4 vb =  10
Savers' cost 0.0661 -0.0140 0.04604
Borrowers' cost -1.5931 -1.7979 -1.8087
All shocks, Second-order Approximation.
Welfare costs are expressed in steady-state consumption-equivalent terms.
Positive gures are costs; negative gures are gains.
Table 4: Welfare Cost
23Figure 1: GDP-Ination Trade-O
Figure 2: Standard Deviation w.r.t. the Interest rate response to Ination
24Figure 3: GDP-Ination Trade-O
Figure 4: Standard Deviation w.r.t. the Interest rate response to Ination
25Figure 5: Technology Shock: Estimated Rule vs b = 0:4 and q = 0:9
2
6Figure 6: Monetary Policy Shock: Estimated Rule vs b = 0:4 and q = 0:9
2
7Figure 7: Standard Deviation (%) w.r.t. Macro-prudential Response to Credit, GDP, or House
Price Growth
28Figure 8: LTV ratio and Debt/GDP responses to alternative LTV ratio rules, x =  10
Figure 9: Welfare w.r.t. a macroprudential rule response to either credit growth, GDP growth or
house price ination
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